

Analysis

Since we were given a VMware Virtual machine consisting of vmdk (hard drive) and vmem (memory) files, I pretended like during my investigation of the suspected server I was able to perform a dump of physical memory and hard drive contents. With these files I can perform offline forensics. Which I think would be the right approach when you can't trust the integrity of the OS you are examining.

I started my investigation by looking at the .vmem file using Volatility.

First looking at a process list. Processes that I marked in red, are immediately suspicious to me as I'm not familiar with the names.

Fast

No.	PID	Time created	Time exited	Offset	PDB	Remarks
1	0			0x00552a20	0x0073a000	Idle
2	672	Mon Mar 14 01:27:58 2011	Mon Mar 14 01:30:44 2011	0x01a54868	0x067002a0	ForceField.exe
3	2392	Mon Mar 14 01:32:04 2011		0x01a9e020	0x06700320	wscntfy.exe
4	2804	Mon Mar 14 01:32:12 2011		0x01aa2da0	0x067002a0	RapportService.
5	1832	Mon Mar 14 03:04:44 2011	Mon Mar 14 03:04:44 2011	0x01ae5020	0x06700500	mrublast.exe
6	2724	Mon Mar 14 03:03:44 2011	Mon Mar 14 03:03:44 2011	0x01b6b020	0x06700440	mrublast.exe
7	2680	Mon Mar 14 03:02:44 2011	Mon Mar 14 03:02:44 2011	0x01c5f5c0	0x067004a0	mrublast.exe
8	2812	Mon Mar 14 01:32:13 2011		0x01c784e0	0x067004c0	alg.exe
9	404	Mon Mar 14 01:31:45 2011		0x01ca02c8	0x06700400	DTLite.exe
10	448	Mon Mar 14 01:31:46 2011		0x01ca0da0	0x06700420	scheduler.exe
11	396	Mon Mar 14 01:31:45 2011		0x01ca7a20	0x067003e0	ctfmon.exe
12	3048	Mon Mar 14 01:32:48 2011	Mon Mar 14 01:32:52 2011	0x01cb3330	0x067003c0	mrublast.exe
13	1784	Mon Mar 14 01:31:38 2011		0x01cb4be0	0x06700140	VMwareTray.exe
14	3368	Mon Mar 14 03:06:17 2011		0x01cb55a8	0x067002c0	Dbgview.exe
15	216	Mon Mar 14 01:31:43 2011		0x01cb9be0	0x067003a0	zlclient.exe
16	1812	Mon Mar 14 01:31:39 2011		0x01cbbda0	0x06700380	VMwareUser.exe
17	1744	Mon Mar 14 01:31:38 2011		0x01cde5b8	0x06700360	VMUpgradeHelper
18	3492	Mon Mar 14 03:06:44 2011	Mon Mar 14 03:06:44 2011	0x01cf35d8	0x06700540	mrublast.exe
19	2456	Mon Mar 14 03:01:44 2011	Mon Mar 14 03:01:45 2011	0x01d0f998	0x067004e0	mrublast.exe
20	1256	Mon Mar 14 01:31:34 2011		0x01d43980	0x06700340	vmtoolsd.exe
21	680	Mon Mar 14 01:31:32 2011		0x01d4b5c8	0x06700300	explorer.exe
22	2620	Mon Mar 14 01:32:27 2011		0x01d6bbf8	0x067002e0	ForceField.exe
23	336	Mon Mar 14 01:31:30 2011		0x01d795b0	0x06700240	hxdef100.exe
24	412	Mon Mar 14 01:31:30 2011		0x01d846a0	0x06700280	taskmgr.exe
25	372	Mon Mar 14 01:31:30 2011		0x01d87240	0x06700260	mysqld.exe
26	2032	Mon Mar 14 01:31:27 2011		0x01dd9020	0x06700220	svchost.exe
27	1944	Mon Mar 14 01:31:27 2011		0x01deeda0	0x06700200	spoolsv.exe
28	1484	Mon Mar 14 01:31:16 2011		0x01e3dc00	0x067001c0	vsmon.exe
29	1356	Mon Mar 14 01:31:14 2011		0x01e53268	0x067001a0	svchost.exe
30	1260	Mon Mar 14 01:31:13 2011		0x01e55da0	0x06700180	svchost.exe
31	1200	Mon Mar 14 01:31:12 2011		0x01e6f860	0x06700160	svchost.exe
32	1036	Mon Mar 14 01:31:09 2011		0x01e80be0	0x06700100	svchost.exe
33	1132	Mon Mar 14 01:31:09 2011		0x01ecb340	0x06700120	RapportMgmtServ
34	948	Mon Mar 14 01:31:09 2011		0x01ed26a0	0x067000e0	svchost.exe
35	3476	Mon Mar 14 03:06:42 2011		0x01ee4020	0x06700520	notepad.exe
36	932	Mon Mar 14 01:31:09 2011		0x01f025c8	0x067000c0	vmacthlp.exe
37	764	Mon Mar 14 01:31:08 2011		0x01f1bda0	0x06700080	services.exe
38	776	Mon Mar 14 01:31:08 2011		0x01f1c6f0	0x067000a0	lsass.exe
39	3240	Mon Mar 14 03:05:44 2011	Mon Mar 14 03:05:44 2011	0x01f1d6b0	0x06700480	mrublast.exe
40	720	Mon Mar 14 01:31:08 2011		0x01f2fbe0	0x06700060	winlogon.exe
41	612	Mon Mar 14 01:31:07 2011		0x01f7d320	0x06700020	smss.exe
42	1884	Mon Mar 14 01:31:27 2011		0x01feca20	0x067001e0	ISWSVC.exe
43	696	Mon Mar 14 01:31:07 2011		0x0218f4a8	0x06700040	csrss.exe
44	660	Mon Mar 14 03:00:44 2011	Mon Mar 14 03:00:47 2011	0x024afda0	0x06700460	mrublast.exe
45	0			0x025c8830	0x0073a000	System

Time for google ☺

ForceField.exe, and ISWSVC.exe seem to be a part of a ZoneAlarm ForceShield

RapportServer.exe and RapportMgmtService.exe – Rapport is a lightweight security software solution that protects web communication between enterprises, such as banks, and their customers and employees. Not sure why this is running maybe part of a MITRE Pilot?

Zlclient.exe – Zone alarm

Mrublaster.exe – for protecting most recently used privacy? Maybe xeno and corey used to help get rid of hints?

Vmachlp.exe – VMware Process, safe

Hxdef100.exe – Hacker Defender Rootkit ☺

DTLite.exe – Daemon Tools, seems safe

Next I Had Volatility dump the modules. Which show all of the drivers loaded in the Operating System. Due to the large amount of modules, I only highlight a few in red that stood out.

Name	Base
\WINDOWS\system32\ntkrnlpa.exe	0x804d7000
\WINDOWS\system32\hal.dll	0x806d0000
\WINDOWS\system32\KDCOM.DLL	0xf8b9a000
\WINDOWS\system32\BOOTVID.dll	0xf8aaa000
sptd.sys	0xf8489000
\WINDOWS\System32\Drivers\WMILIB.SYS	0xf8b9c000
\WINDOWS\System32\Drivers\SCSIPIRT.SYS	0xf8471000
ACPI.sys	0xf8443000
pci.sys	0xf8432000
isapnp.sys	0xf869a000
combatt.sys	0xf8aae000
\WINDOWS\system32\DRIVERS\BATTC.SYS	0xf8ab2000
intelide.sys	0xf8b9e000
\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\PCIIDEX.SYS	0xf891a000
MountMgr.sys	0xf86aa000
ftdisk.sys	0xf8413000
dmload.sys	0xf8ba0000
dmio.sys	0xf83ed000
PartMgr.sys	0xf8922000
VolSnap.sys	0xf86ba000
atapi.sys	0xf83d5000
vm SCSI.sys	0xf8ab6000
disk.sys	0xf86ca000
\WINDOWS\system32\DRIVERS\CLASSPNP.SYS	0xf86da000
fltMgr.sys	0xf83b5000
sr.sys	0xf83a3000
KSecDD.sys	0xf838c000
Ntfs.sys	0xf82ff000
NDIS.sys	0xf82d2000
RapportKELL.sys	0xf86ea000
Mup.sys	0xf82b8000
agp440.sys	0xf86fa000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\intelppm.sys	0xf872a000

\SystemRoot\System32\DRIVERS\i8042prt.sys	0xf873a000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\kbdclass.sys	0xf8952000
\SystemRoot\System32\Drivers\Ctr12cap.SYS	0xf8d18000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\mouclass.sys	0xf895a000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\parport.sys	0xf824b000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\serial.sys	0xf874a000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\serenum.sys	0xf8b46000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\fdc.sys	0xf896a000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\imapi.sys	0xf875a000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\cdrom.sys	0xf876a000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\redbook.sys	0xf877a000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\ks.sys	0xf8228000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\vmx_svga.sys	0xf8982000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\VIDEOPRT.SYS	0xf8214000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\vmxnet.sys	0xf898a000
\SystemRoot\System32\Drivers\azdow88m.SYS	0xf81d7000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\CmBatt.sys	0xf8b66000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\audstub.sys	0xf8d36000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\rasl2tp.sys	0xf878a000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\ndistapi.sys	0xf8b6e000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\ndiswan.sys	0xf81c0000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\rasppoe.sys	0xf879a000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\rasppptp.sys	0xf87aa000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\TDI.SYS	0xf8a12000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\psched.sys	0xf8187000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\msgpc.sys	0xf87ba000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\ptilink.sys	0xf8a22000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\raspti.sys	0xf8a32000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\rdpdr.sys	0xf8157000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\termdd.sys	0xf87ca000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\swenum.sys	0xf8bac000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\update.sys	0xf80f9000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\mssmbios.sys	0xf8b92000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\dtsoftbus01.sys	0xf80be000
\SystemRoot\System32\Drivers\NDProxy.SYS	0xf87da000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\flpydisk.sys	0xf8a5a000
\SystemRoot\System32\Drivers\Fs_Rec.SYS	0xf8bb0000
\SystemRoot\System32\Drivers\Null.SYS	0xf8d7a000
\SystemRoot\System32\Drivers\Beep.SYS	0xf8bb4000
\SystemRoot\System32\drivers\vga.sys	0xf8a72000
\SystemRoot\System32\Drivers\mnmdd.SYS	0xf8bb8000
\SystemRoot\System32\DRIVERS\RDPCDD.sys	0xf8bbc000
\SystemRoot\System32\Drivers\Msfs.SYS	0xf8a82000
\SystemRoot\System32\Drivers\Npfs.SYS	0xf8a92000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\rasacd.sys	0xf8b4e000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\ipsec.sys	0xf4c86000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\tcpip.sys	0xf4c2d000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\netbt.sys	0xf4c05000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\ipnat.sys	0xf4bdf000
\SystemRoot\System32\vsdatant.sys	0xf4b5e000
\SystemRoot\System32\drivers\ws2ifsl.sys	0xf81bc000
\SystemRoot\System32\drivers\afd.sys	0xf4b14000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\netbios.sys	0xf87fa000
\SystemRoot\System32\DRIVERS\vmhgfs.sys	0xf4af6000
\\?\C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\sysenter.sys	0xf8db7000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\rdbss.sys	0xf4acb000
\\?\C:\Program Files\Trusteer\Rapport\bin\RapportPG.sys	0xf4aa6000
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\wanarp.sys	0xf881a000
\\?\C:\Program Files\Trusteer\Rapport\bin\RapportEI.sys	0xf882a000
\\?\C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\WINDOWS\Application	
Data\Trusteer\Rapport\store\texts\RapportCerberus\baseline\RapportCerberus_23645.sys	
0xf883a000	
\SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\mrxsm.sys	0xf4a36000
\SystemRoot\System32\Drivers\Fips.SYS	0xf884a000
\\?\C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\Ctr12Cap.sys	0xf8dd6000
\\?\C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\BASIC.sys	0xf8dd8000
\SystemRoot\System32\Drivers\Cdfs.SYS	0xf886a000
\SystemRoot\System32\Drivers\dump_atapi.sys	0xf49f6000
\SystemRoot\System32\Drivers\dump_WMILIB.SYS	0xf8bc8000
\SystemRoot\System32\win32k.sys	0xbf800000
\SystemRoot\System32\drivers\Dxapi.sys	0xf5f69000

Now that I have some hints, I want to examine the contents of the hard drive to look at these .sys file in more detail. I searched the Internet to find that vmware has a tool available for download called vmware-mount.exe. It allows you to mount a vmdk file as a drive letter on your computer. When initially trying to run the tool as documented, it would not work because it stated that the hard drive is from a suspended virtual machine.

I decided to take a look in IDA to find where that check was being made.

Above is a screen shot of the where the test and jump are located (0x0040BD40). If you set a breakpoint at that location, and when the breakpoint hits modify the EIP register value to 0x0040BD6E, then continue. The process will exit normally and your drive letter will be mapped.

```
j: "c:\rootvm\RootkitClassVM v1.1\RootkitClassVM.vmdk"
```

Just make sure the path in the above text points to your vmdk file. I do not guaranty this method to always work.

MAKE SURE YOU DO THIS ON A COPY OF THE VMDK FILE. This volume will be mounted as read write, so be careful.

Once the drive has been mounted, I can navigate the file system.

```
J:\>dir
Volume in drive J has no label.
Volume Serial Number is B48F-163D

Directory of J:\

11/17/2008  12:02 AM                0 AUTOEXEC.BAT
11/17/2008  12:02 AM                0 CONFIG.SYS
11/17/2008  12:08 AM            <DIR>      Documents and Settings
03/13/2011  08:38 PM            <DIR>      hxdef100r
03/06/2011  10:02 PM            244 INSTALL.LOG
03/13/2011  05:23 PM            <DIR>      Program Files
03/06/2011  10:08 PM            <DIR>      vanquish-0.2.1
03/13/2011  08:16 PM            486 vanquish.log
03/11/2011  05:01 PM            <DIR>      WinDDK
03/13/2011  09:24 PM            <DIR>      WINDOWS
               4 File(s)              730 bytes
               6 Dir(s)  3,030,482,944 bytes free
```

Three things pop out right away when viewing the directory listing. The directory for hacker defender rootkit and a program called vanquish which is a user space rootkit.

At this point I decided to examine the registry to see what services are installed, and what programs are set to startup on reboot. I used the following link for how to use regedit to view registry files from another computer. I found that this caused some changes to be made in the vmk file that can corrupt the image. Please make sure you do this while using a backup copy.

<http://4sysops.com/archives/regedit-as-offline-registry-editor/>

Once I'm able to view the registry using regedit I used the following link to figure out where services are located.

http://infocenter.sybase.com/help/index.jsp?topic=/com.sybase.dc36556_1500/html/histerv/X37757.htm

I went through all of the services listed and the ones that stand out are:

- BASIC.sys – Set as device driver, running strings shows reference to rootkit.
- BreakOnThruToTheOtherSide.sys – Manual Startup, from intermediate x86.
- Ctr12Cap.sys – Set as device driver, seems very strange? 1 (one) instead of L, set as device driver. Strings shows api for KeServiceDescriptorTable, which it probably hooks.
- Gmer.sys – Looks like this is installed to help us find rootkits.
- C:\hxdef100r\hxdef100.exe – Set to start up.

- hxdefdrv.sys – Set to manual, but it was listed in the modules list so we know that it was started manually.
- sysenter.sys – nothing found on google. But running strings on the .sys file, you see the term rootkit. Set to start as a driver.
- "C:\WINDOWS\vanquish.exe" – Set to automatically start.

Next I went through all of the other registry locations listed in the following link to look for more programs that can startup on reboot.

<http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/tutorials/tutorial44.html>

- HKLM\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
 - wscript.exe "C:\WINDOWS\fat.vbs" "C:\WINDOWS\fat.bat"


```
$ cat fat.bat
@ECHO OFF
cd C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers
fu -ph 4
..\InstDriver.exe -install mmpc mmpc.sys
..\InstDriver.exe -start mmpc
fu -phd msdirectx.sys
fu -phd mmpc.sys
sc delete mmpc
exit
```

Above is the only entry I found that looked out of the norm.

This using the FU rootkit to install and hide a driver called mmpc. Running strings on mmpc.sys shows references to shadow walker/ corey directory. Definitely a rootkit. ☺

mmpc.sys and msdirectx.sys are rootkit related.

Removal

I thought that the removal would be an easy process but I ran into a snag.

First I booted up the VM, and restarted it to go into safe mode.

Once in safe mode, I went through all off the registry locations and set all the drivers listed above to be manual by setting the startup entry to the value 3. I also removed the entry to fat.bat from running. One thing I noticed while I was in the registry was no reference to the HackerDefender rootkit. I thought this was really strange. I found a really good pdf on HackerDefender. The paper only described the way to remove the

rootkit was to remove all the files associated, however no files were visible because the rootkit was running.

So, I shutdown the VM. I remounted the vmdk file using the same trick described above, but this time using the real vmdk not a backup copy. Once I had the volume mounted I tried to make a copy.

```
J:\hxdef100r>copy hxdef100.exe ..  
Access is denied.  
0 file(s) copied.
```

After trying to copy I did a directory listing and found that the file was missing. My local virus software had quarantined the file. At first I thought that the vmdk file would become corrupted because of this. I unmounted the volume and restarted the VM. I was happy to see that HackerDefender was no longer running. ☺

The HackerDefender directory is now visible in my VM.

References:

<http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/startups/RapportMgmtService.exe-26152.html>
http://infocenter.sybase.com/help/index.jsp?topic=/com.sybase.dc36556_1500/html/histserv/X37757.htm
<http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/tutorials/tutorial144.html>
<http://www.softpedia.com/get/System/System-Miscellaneous/Ctrl2cap.shtml>
http://www.fbmssoftware.com/spyware-net/process/mrublaster_exe/3191/
<http://4sysops.com/archives/regedit-as-offline-registry-editor/>
<http://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/fu.shtml>
<http://www.techbytes.ca/techbyte74.html>
www.carnal0wnage.com/papers/rootkit_for_the_masses.pdf